Browsing by Author "Zegarra, Luis F."

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2

Acción colectiva, regímenes políticos y crecimiento económico: hacia una discusión teórica
(Universidad del Pacífico. Centro de Investigación, 2000) Zegarra, Luis F.
Not a few people believe that the lack of debate and negotiation is in favor of the economic growth, because it permits the application of economic measures without taking into account the interests of certain pressure groups. In this paper, we try to demonstrate that the reality is totally contrary. For that, we discuss theoretically how the production of the rules of the game is affected by the characteristics of the political market, particularly by the collective action and by the nature of the political regime. On the basis of this analysis, we conclude that the rules of the game are in favor of the economic growth if the transaction costs to conform a group are depreciable, if the groups congregate wide sectors of the society and have adequate accountability mechanisms, and if the political power is not concentrated.
¿Por qué las autocracias promueven la inestabilidad política y económica?: Perú, 1948-1956
(Universidad del Pacífico. Centro de Investigación, 2001) Zegarra, Luis F.
Some authors think autocracies, unlike democracies, can follow economic policies that promote private investment and economic growth, without being influenced by demands of some lobbies, which pretend to mantain and expand their privilegies. Odria's autocracy (1948-1956) seems to be an example of the autocratic advantage. During Odria's government, concentration of political power permitted Odria to pursue an ortodox economic program and promote privte investment on mining and exporting agriculture. However, those policies were possible because the lobbies very close to the government in those years (exporters) promoted such policies. If the most powerful lobbies had demanded protectionist policies, economic policies would have been totally different. On the other hand, even though at the beginning of his government, Odria could impose a liberal economic program, along the years he had to concede some populist privilegies to popular organizations in order to guarantee political stability. Actually, Odria's government is a clear example that autocracies, instead of pursuing ortodox economic programs during a long period, provoke instability and populism.